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Abstract 
We examine international public opinion towards stem-cell research during the period when the 
issue was at its most contentious. We draw upon representative sample surveys in Europe and 
North America, fielded in 2005 and find that the majority of people in Europe, Canada and the 
United States supported stem-cell research, providing it was tightly regulated, but that there 
were key differences between the geographical regions in the relative importance of different 
types of ethical position. In the U.S., moral acceptability was more influential as a driver of 
support for stem-cell research; in Europe the perceived benefit to society carried more weight; 
and in Canada the two were almost equally important. We also find that public opinion on stem-
cell research was more strongly associated with religious convictions in the U.S. than in Canada 
and Europe, although many strongly religious citizens in all regions approved of stem-cell 
research.  We conclude that if anything public opinion or ‘public ethics’ are likely to play an 
increasingly important role in framing policy and regulatory regimes for sensitive technologies 
in the future. 
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Introduction 
A number of development trajectories in the domain of modern biotechnology – most notably 
the fate of GM food in Europe – have demonstrated the centrality of public concerns in 
sustainable technology development. The reception of new technologies by the public is linked 
to judgements about risks and benefits, but it is also based on ethical issues and general ideas 
about ‘how we want to live,’ and this is particularly the case for sensitive technologies in the 
life sciences. Given the ongoing explosion of new gene-based technologies such as synthetic 
biology, cloning, gene editing and personalized medicine, we seek in this paper to add historical 
context to such debates by examining an exemplar case – that of human embryonic stem-cell 
research.  
 
The history of political and public debates about novel interventions in the process of 
reproduction appears to repeat itself. Recent controversies over the future of stem-cell research 
[1, 2](1, 2)  echo elements of earlier debates on contraception and in-vitro fertilisation (IVF), 
but they also prefigure more recent ones on synthetic biology and gene editing [3, 4](3, 4). At 
the centre of these debates is the question: ‘what are the limits to human intervention in matters 
of life?’ Offering the opportunity of sex without reproduction, contraception was considered by 
some to be an aberration and a threat to the moral order. Much the same was said of IVF, which 
brought the possibility of reproduction without sex. Yet with some exceptions both 
contraception and IVF are now broadly accepted and in widespread use. 
 
Two decades have passed since ‘Dolly’ the cloned sheep swept the world’s headlines, 
generating moral outrage over the boundaries of acceptable interference in creation [5](5). 
Research has continued and the debate has become more nuanced, most notably after the 
isolation of embryonic stem-cells; and we saw the distinction between therapeutic and 
reproductive cloning being developed in public discourse [6](6). As research evolved into the 
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new millennium, stem-cell research became one of the most contested issues in science policy 
making. While stem-cell research is heralded as a major breakthrough in biomedical science, as 
Nielsen notes, it was ‘attained with cloning having the dubious status of the most promising as 
well as the most controversial among the many emerging biotechnologies’ [7](7). The National 
Research Council in the U.S. wrote that stem-cell research has led ‘scientists and non-scientists 
alike to contemplate profound issues, such as who we are and what makes us human beings.’ 
[8](8). 
Public ethics 
Alongside elite discourse and debate, amongst scientists, legislators, regulators and ethicists, the 
opinions of lay publics have been, and continue to be, important. We use the term ‘public 
ethics’ not because we assume that public opinions are necessarily evidence of intensive 
deliberation or elaboration by the public such as that practiced by professional ethicists. Rather 
it is because we regard it as plausible to map some important attitudinal dimensions onto 
established ethical principles or moral positions. The reason for this comes from recent thinking 
in empirical moral psychology. In this field, recognized ethical and moral positions are regarded 
as formalisations of existing more fundamental attitudes and intuitions, rather than the latter 
being led by the former [9](9).  This being the case, such public ethics or opinions can act to 
constrain or enable scientific and technological development in democratic societies [10](10). 
Where such developments tap into especially ‘hot button’ issues or themes, public attitudes can, 
and do, come to the attention of politicians and regulators and sometimes have palpable effects 
on policy regimes and funding priorities. For example, the unofficial EU moratorium on 
commercial planting of genetically modified (GM) crops was one of the higher profile instances 
of politics and science colliding in the form of a World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute. 
European public opinion was – and remains – negative and very few GM crops are farmed in 
Europe despite a scientific consensus for their safety. Underlining this, one of the key biotech 
firms, BASF, moved its research operations to the U.S. in 2012, citing consumer resistance [11, 
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12](11, 12).  That the controversy over GM crops led to a trade dispute between the U.S. and 
the EU underscores the importance of a comparative approach to understanding the foundations 
for public opinion about contentious science and technology. To cite another contemporary 
example, within the US, public beliefs about anthropocentric global warming split along 
partisan lines [13](13) and the policy positions of Democrats and Republicans have to be 
understood in the context of the opinions of their supporters.   Different cultural sensitivities 
mean therefore that it cannot be assumed that public opinion towards new scientific and 
technological developments will align in the same way in different parts of the world or in 
different socio-political contexts.   
 
The first step for the current paper is to investigate and map out cross-national differences in 
public opinion on stem-cell research. The second is to examine what may underlie such 
differences as are observed, such that once such common factors are accounted for these cross-
national differences are attenuated or eliminated. Drawing on data from three comparative 
social surveys, which together captured public opinion in Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada 
at a time when the stem-cell debate was at its height (in the mid-2000s), we investigate factors 
underlying divergences in public perceptions. Of particular interest in the current research is the 
extent to which particular attitudes underlying approval of stem-cell research assume varying 
importance in different parts of the world. 
 
Stem-cell research and ethical dilemmas for policy makers 
The controversies surrounding human embryonic stem-cell research bring into focus two ideal-
type ethical positions or world-views, which we could refer to as a ‘sanctity of life’ ethic and a 
‘quality of life’ ethic. The ‘sanctity of life’ ethic outlines a deontological position that sees the 
embryo as a human being that, as such, possesses rights that are inviolable. Given that stem-cell 
research involves the destruction of embryos, it would be unethical to pursue it [14](14). By 
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contrast, a ‘quality of life’ ethic argues for a utilitarian approach: a paramount duty to alleviate 
suffering, and given that this research may lead to cures for some serious diseases, it would be 
unethical not to pursue it. 
 
A starting premise of our study is that, when considering the viability of stem-cell research, 
researchers, politicians, regulators and the public at large are confronted by a classic dilemma: 
namely, how to come to terms with these two competing perspectives. Across Europe, the 
United States and Canada, politicians and regulators have adopted different resolutions to this 
dilemma. An adoption of a ‘sanctity of life’ position was initially evident in the U.S., where the 
Bush administration limited federally funded stem-cell research to the use of a small number of 
existing cell lines. Congressional bills to allow the federal government to fund embryonic stem-
cell research using supernumerary embryos from fertility clinics were vetoed by President Bush 
in 2006 and 2007. The premise of this position was 
 
‘…not an attempt to answer the question of how the government might best advance embryonic 
stem-cell research while conforming to the law on the subject. Rather, it [was] an attempt to 
answer the question of how the government might avoid encouraging the (presumptively) 
unethical act of embryo destruction and still advance the worthy cause of medical research.’ 
[15](15) 
 
Some governments across the EU likewise issued similar cautious edicts based on concern for 
the sanctity of life vested in human embryos. In November 2005 an ethical declaration was 
signed by Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Slovakia that called for the 
exclusion of any kind of stem-cell research from European public funding under the seventh 
framework programme for research that ran from 2007 to 2013. 
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In the U.S., the policy position adopted by the Bush administration was reversed in 2009 when 
an Executive Order was issued by President Barack Obama: 
 
‘For the past 8 years, the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services, including 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to fund and conduct human embryonic stem-cell 
research has been limited by Presidential actions.  The purpose of this order is to remove these 
limitations on scientific inquiry, to expand NIH support for the exploration of human stem-cell 
research, and in so doing to enhance the contribution of America's scientists to important new 
discoveries and new therapies for the benefit of humankind.’ [16](16) 
 
This lifting of restrictions on federal funding of stem-cell research arguably now placed the U.S. 
alongside ‘quality of life’ proponents found in some EU member states. In Denmark, Greece, 
Finland, France, the Netherlands and Spain a liberal form of regulation allows for the 
procurement of stem-cell research from supernumerary embryos. Belgium, Sweden and the UK 
took a step further, legalising the creation of human embryos for the procurement of embryonic 
stem-cells, but only under strict conditions.  
 
Despite some national differences within Europe on the issue of stem-cell research, notably in 
Germany and Portugal [17](17), the European Union adopted a compromise position, albeit 
leaning towards a regime where research could take place. In June 2006 the EU Parliament 
approved the Commission’s proposal to support the use of public funds for stem-cell research. 
Subsequently, the European Council of Ministers agreed to allow the use of public funds for 
stem-cell research, and only  to prohibit the use of public funds for the procurement of new 
embryonic stem-cell lines. This echoes the policy climate in Canada, which legalised stem-cell 
research in 2004 on embryos that are surplus from fertility clinics, but retained a ban on 
therapeutic cloning and the creation of embryos for research. 
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Across the three regions we can see, then, three distinct policy climates, ranging from a negative 
policy of restriction in the U.S. under the Bush administration, to a compromise position in 
Canada, to a position of broadly positive engagement in Europe. It has been argued that this 
kind of variation in regulatory regimes exists partly due to the strong influence of religion on 
politics in the U.S. in relation to Western Europe and to a lesser extent Canada [18](18). This 
view perhaps overstates the causal influence of religion on political attitudes, but it is 
nevertheless true that conservative ideologies tend at least to be associated closely with religious 
culture in the U.S. and are often expressed more in 'moral' imperatives rather than the more 
liberal concerns of equality and collective utility [19](19). This religio-cultural climate is often 
contrasted with the more secular-based style of government in Western Europe, particularly 
when considering the influence of prevailing religious norms on social and political attitudes 
[20](20). 
  
The present research 
Since embryonic stem-cell research came to public attention in the early 2000s, the broad trend 
for public perceptions has been for either stability or a relaxing of concerns. These trends have 
also led towards greater convergence in public opinion internationally, although the bases on 
which public perceptions are founded may be quite different. Understanding these bases is the 
focus of the present enquiry. According to the Virginia Commonwealth University Life Science 
Survey series (a nationally representative random-digit-dial survey), public support for stem-cell  
research in the U.S. rose from 40 percent in 2002 to around 65 percent in 2010 [21](21). 
Another survey, carried out in 2005 by Knowledge Networks on behalf of the Genetics & 
Public Policy Center, found that 67 percent of Americans approved of stem-cell research. 
Interestingly, while overall approval was high, the same survey found that all but 12 percent of 
respondents held at least some conflicting views about the need to preserve embryos versus the 
need to pursue research [22](22). That attitudes were far from unambiguous illustrates the need 
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to look beyond simple approval ratings in order to understand public views on stem-cell 
research.  
 
 When it was last systematically measured with Eurobarometer surveys [23, 24](23, 24), the 
percentage of Europeans approving of embryonic stem-cell research with either usual, or tighter 
regulations, was around 65 percent in both 2005 and in 2010.  In Canada, the most recent 
evidence comes from an Angus Reid survey, which estimated the moral acceptability of stem-
cell research was espoused by 65 percent of adult Canadians [25](25).  
 
While we have some evidence that attitudes between our three regions have converged in recent 
times, our interest in the current study is in understanding what the differing bases of these 
attitudes were at a time when debate was at its height and most salient in the minds of the 
public, in the mid-2000s. The variation between the U.S., Canada and Europe in styles of 
governance, regulatory regimes and cultural contexts provides a useful comparative framework 
to explore differences in attitudes towards stem-cell research. One of the hypotheses that we 
assess in what follows is that national differences in approval of stem-cell research may be 
explained by different levels of religiosity. Furthermore, we would expect to see religiosity as 
being associated with more negative attitudes towards stem-cell research. Moreover, we would 
expect to see this relationship having its strongest effect in the U.S., then Canada and finally 
Europe. 
 
Going beyond religiosity itself, the foregoing suggests that the ethical perspectives associated 
with religious versus secular based governance might also be reflected in the roots of public 
attitudes in these different regions. We would expect, therefore, that moral concerns were more 
influential for Americans and Canadians than for Western Europeans in coming to a judgment 
about stem-cell research. Concomitantly, we would also expect that considerations of benefits 
more than moral concerns have played a greater role for public attitudes in Western Europe than 
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across the Atlantic. To summarise then, our research questions, which we seek to answer with 
data gathered during this critical period, are as follows: 
 
• What is the difference between the U.S., Canada and Western Europe in levels of public 
approval of stem-cell research? 
 
• What is the influence of each of two types of perspectives on approval – moral concerns 
and perceptions of benefits? 
 
• How do these influences vary in their importance across the U.S., Canada and Western 
Europe? 
 
To answer these questions, we tested a series of regression models to demonstrate firstly the 
extent to which attitudes differ between the U.S., Canada and Western Europe, after accounting 
for differences in the demographic composition of the three regions. Secondly we assessed the 
role of ethical considerations using two variables that broadly capture moral  and benefit-based 
(or utilitarian) concerns. Finally, we investigated the relative importance of these perspectives 
across the three regions.   
 
 
 
 
Data and methods 
The surveys 
Eurobarometer 64.3 on Biotechnology was the sixth in the series of surveys of public 
perceptions of biotechnology that began in 1991. The survey was fielded in 2005 in 25 member 
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states of the European Union and afforded a unique opportunity to carry out comparative 
research between Europe and North America, with a set of harmonised questions being asked in 
each region. Multi-stage random sampling procedures were used to provide a statistically 
representative sample of national residents aged 15 and over, with a total sample of circa 25,000 
respondents interviewed face to face [26](26). The Canadian Biotechnology Strategy 
Secretariat's ‘International Public Opinion Research on Emerging Technologies’ survey was 
conducted during January and February 2005 in Canada and in the U.S.. Random digit dialling 
was used to select representative probability samples of 2,000 respondents in Canada and 1,200 
respondents in the U.S., all aged 18 years or above, who were interviewed by telephone [27, 
28](27, 28). Both the the Canadian and European surveys had a split-ballot design where only a 
random half of the respondents were asked all of the questions included in the analyses 
presented here. 
 
The response variable: support for stem-cell research 
Canadian and U.S. respondents were given the following description: 
 
‘stem-cell research involves the use of special human cells to study diseases and their cures. 
stem-cells have the unique ability to grow into any type of cell in the human body. stem-cell 
research has led to breakthroughs in our understanding of diabetes, MS, and Parkinson’s disease 
that offer the potential for new treatments and cures. However, to conduct this research, 
scientists have to get stem-cells. They have been getting them from human embryos that are less 
than 2 weeks old and have been frozen and stored in fertility clinics. However, these embryos 
will only be used for research if they are not going to be used for fertility treatments. A recently 
discovered way of getting them is to extract stem-cells from the blood contained in umbilical 
cords that people could donate to research after giving birth. The umbilical cords would in most 
cases be frozen and stored for future scientific use’.  
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Following this description, respondents in U.S. and Canada were asked: ‘Overall, which of the 
following best captures your views about stem-cell research?’.  European respondents were 
given a shorter but similar description: 
 
‘stem-cell research involves taking human cells either from human embryos that are less than 2 
weeks and that will never be transplanted into a women body old or from the blood in umbilical 
cords to grow new cells which can be used to treat certain diseases in different parts of the 
body’. 
 
The question posed alongside this description is very similar to the U.S. and Canadian version: 
‘Overall, which of the following best captures your views about using stem-cells?’  However, in 
Europe, respondents were asked separately for their views on research using embryonic stem-
cells, and research using non-embryonic stem-cells.  For the latter, they were presented with the 
following qualified description: ‘Suppose scientists were able to get all the stem-cells they need 
for research from umbilical cords and no longer had to get them from embryos’. While the two 
formulations of the context in which stem-cell research is to be approved or not are somewhat 
different, we do not have serious cause to believe that question wording differences greatly 
affect the comparability. 
 
The response alternatives for these questions in both surveys were as follows:  
 
I approve the use of stem-cell research, as long as the usual levels of government regulation and 
control are in place; 
I approve of stem-cell research if it is more tightly controlled and regulated; 
I do not approve of stem-cell research except under very special circumstances; and, 
I do not approve of stem-cell research under any circumstances. 
 13 
 
 
Bearing in mind variation in national regulatory frameworks for stem-cell research, it could be 
argued that the response ‘I approve the use of stem-cell research, as long as the usual 
regulations apply’ indicates markedly different levels of support in different countries. 
However, drawing on Sudman et al [29](29), we conjecture that respondents use the response 
alternatives as important cues in the interpretation of the meaning of the question. As such, they 
would consistently interpret the four alternatives as ordered categorical points representing a 
continuum from approval through increasing strictness of regulation to a veto.  This means that, 
for example, even in those contexts in which stem-cell research is not permitted by regulation, 
respondents who are opposed to stem-cell research would select alternative 4 rather than 1. For 
the descriptive statistics, we dichotomised this variable to distinguish approval from 
disapproval, while in the regression models, we use the full scale.  
 
Measuring religious commitment 
We use the reported frequency of attendance at religious services as a proxy for religious 
commitment. Respondents in Europe were asked: ‘Apart from weddings or funerals, about how 
often do you attend religious services?’ Respondents in the U.S. and Canada were asked: ‘In the 
past, how often have you attended a service at a place of worship?’, and interviewers were given 
the instruction: ‘If asked, do not include weddings and funerals.’ In both surveys the response 
alternatives were: ‘More than once a week’; ‘At least once a week’; ‘Several times a month’; 
‘At least once a month’; ‘A couple of times a year’; ‘About once a year’; and ‘Never.’ 
 
Using the reported frequency of attendance at religious services as a proxy for religious 
commitment clearly oversimplifies a set of complex issues regarding the nature of religious 
faith and practice. Nevertheless, the measure of religiosity that we employed here is in 
widespread use in political science and sociology (for instance, it is repeated annually in the 
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General Social Survey [30](30)) and has been shown to correlate strongly with other measures 
of religious identity as well as political and social attitudes [31, 32](31, 32).  Conceptually and 
empirically social scientists often distinguish between religiosity, membership and practices. A 
propos of this it may be asked, what of Muslims who may, simply as a matter of course, attend 
services more frequently than Christians? What of those with a faith who do not attend religious 
services?  
 
Our justification for the simple measure of frequency of attendance is based on pragmatic 
grounds. In Europe, Canada and the U.S., Christianity (combining Protestants, Catholics and the 
Orthodox) is the dominant religion – over 70%. The Christian churches have reasonably similar 
patterns of services, thus it may be expected that, by and large, the frequency of church 
attendance is related to religious commitment. After the Christians the next largest group is 
atheists/agnostics at 10-15% with Muslims and Jews between 1 and 2 percent [26].1 Thus, in a 
national sample survey of 1,000 persons (as in the Eurobarometer) we would expect between 10 
and 15 Muslims. As such, without much larger and costlier samples, or booster samples for 
certain religious groups, it is simply not worth collecting detailed information on religion, 
because any analysis could not be generalised with confidence. That said, a comparison between 
those of the Catholic and Protestant churches might have been of interest. Protestants are the 
largest group in the U.S. (although there are many varieties) while Catholics are the largest in 
Europe [33](33). However, this question of denomination was not asked in the U.S. and 
Canadian surveys.  
 
Measuring moral acceptability  and perceived benefits  of stem-cell research 
In the U.S. and Canada, respondents were asked:  
 
                                                   
1
 Authors’ own estimates from Eurobarometer 64.3 
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‘In terms of the moral or ethical aspect of this research, again using the 1-5 scale, where 1 
means that stem-cell research is morally unacceptable, 5 means it is morally acceptable, and the 
mid point 3 means it is morally questionable, how do you view this kind of research?’  
 
They were also asked:  
 
‘I would like to understand the extent to which you think stem-cell research might benefit our 
society. Using a scale of 1-5, where 1 is no benefit and 5 is substantial benefit, and the mid-
point 3 is moderate benefit, how beneficial do you think stem-cell research will be to our 
society?’  
 
In Europe, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed to the following two 
statements:  
 
‘It is ethically wrong to use human embryos in medical research even if it might offer promising 
new treatments’;  
 
‘stem-cell research will help with cures and treatments for serious diseases’.  
 
The response alternatives were: ‘Totally agree’; ‘Tend to agree’; ‘Tend to disagree’; and 
‘Totally disagree’. To achieve comparability between the two surveys, the data from the U.S. 
and Canada were rescaled to conform to the range of 1 to 4 to match the European question. 
This facilitated easier comparison of effect sizes in the regression models. For the purposes of 
showing descriptive statistics, to enhance the clarity of the tables, responses were recoded into a 
binary variable where the value of one indicates positive views (i.e. greater than 2 on the longer 
scaled version) and zero otherwise.  
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Control variables  
In addition to these substantive variables, we also included controls for age, education and 
gender. Age was captured with binary variables representing age groups 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 
45-54, 55-64, 65+. Education was measured with a set of binary variables denoting the 
following levels: less than high school, high school, some college or greater, still studying. We 
also include “don’t know” responses to this question, as there were a small but non-trivial 
number of these in the European sample (94). Gender was recorded as a binary indicator. 
 
Results 
Levels of overall support for stem-cell research vary somewhat by region.  Table 1 summarises 
these variations. Combining the approval scores and working across the table, we can see that 
Europeans are the least approving out of the three regions (62 percent), compared to the data 
from the U.S. (73 percent) and Canada (81 percent). The combined disapproval rates 
demonstrate slightly less variation - Europe (23 percent), U.S. (27 percent) and Canada (18 
percent). The major difference between the regions, however, is that European respondents are 
far more likely to say “don’t know” (15 percent) compared to the U.S. and Canada (at most 1 
percent). If we disregard “don’t know”s from the analysis then the proportions in each region 
expressing approval become more closely aligned.      
 
 
Table 1 Attitudes towards stem-cell research in Europe, the United States and Canada 
 
% respondents within 
region/country 
Europe United 
States 
Canada 
Embryonic Non-
embryonic 
 
Mean   
Approve with usual levels of 
government regulation and 
control 
23 28 25 41 36 
Approve if more tightly 
controlled and regulated 
36 37 37 32 45 
Do not approve except under 
very special circumstances 
17 14 15 19 14 
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Do not approve under any 
circumstances 
9 7 8 8 4 
Don't know 15 14 15 1 0 
Base* 10,192 10,312   1,200 1,000 
* Not all questions were asked of all respondents, hence the reduced sample sizes in Europe and 
the U.S. 
 
 
Religious commitment – captured in terms of frequency of attending religious services – is 
typically higher in the U.S. than in Canada, and typically slightly higher in Canada than in 
Europe.  In our data,  12 percent of Americans report attending religious services more than 
once a week, compared to 4 percent of Canadians and 3 percent of Europeans; by contrast, only 
19 percent of American respondents attend less than once a year, compared to 31 percent of 
Canadians and fully 40 percent of Europeans.   
 
From the outset, we expected that greater religious commitment would be associated with 
weaker support for stem-cell research. We also hypothesised that religiosity would be a more 
important basis for approval or disapproval of stem-cell research in the U.S. compared to 
Canada and Europe. Table 2 shows that in all regions, approval of stem-cell research does 
indeed decline as religious commitment increases.  The pattern is less pronounced in Europe 
than in the U.S. and Canada, lending initial support for our hypothesis. It is important to note, 
though, that even among the most religious, around half of the public approves of stem-cell 
research in the U.S., Canada and in Europe.  
 
Table 2 Attitudes towards stem-cell research by religious attendance 
 
 
More than once a 
week 
Once a week About once a 
month 
Two times a year or 
less 
U.S.     
Approve 48 63 77 87 
Disapprove 51 35 22 12 
Don’t know 1 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Canada     
Approve 49 70 81 86 
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Disapprove 49 30 19 14 
Don’t know 2 0 0 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Europe     
Approve 49 46 56 64 
Disapprove 26 26 24 20 
Don’t know 24 28 20 16 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
 
These descriptive results suggest that religion is strongly associated with support for and 
opposition to stem-cell research in all regions. In the next section we present multivariate 
models where we have  explored in more detail the extent to which, alongside religion, different 
ethical perspectives are associated with approval, and how this varies by region. 
 
Multivariate models  
In what follows, we present a series of multivariate OLS regression models through which we 
can build a picture of the social and geographical bases of support for stem-cell research. The 
analytic sample for all of our models contains 10761 respondents. The reduction in sample size 
is principally due to the fact that not all questions were asked of all respondents in both of the 
surveys combined with some item non-response.   The first set of models (1 to 3) assesses the 
association with approval of region and religiosity and the interaction between these two 
variables. A fourth model adds controls for age, gender and education to check the robustness of 
the associations observed in the first set. Two further sets of models (5-8) include moral 
(sanctity of life ethic) and benefit (utilitarian ethic) attitudes and, again, the interaction between 
these factors and region. In this way, we can assess the extent to which both moral and benefit 
based concerns are implicated in approval as well as the relative importance of these in 
determining levels of approval in the U.S., Canada and Europe. The final model (9) combines 
all of these variables. 
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Table 3 presents unstandardized regression coefficients for each of these models. In model 1, 
dummy variables for Canada and the U.S. have positive coefficients, which confirm what we 
saw in the bivariate tables presented earlier: namely, that levels of approval are higher in North 
America than in Europe. In model 2 we added religiosity and confirm, again, that people for 
whom religion is more important are less approving of stem-cell research, irrespective of the 
continent in which they live. Our first hypothesis was that religion would be more important in 
understanding attitudes to stem-cell research in the U.S. than elsewhere. In model 3 we included 
product-term interactions of religiosity and region and find that the negative association of 
religiosity with approval in the U.S. is indeed stronger than in Canada and Europe. The 
statistically significant coefficient for this interaction is -0.08, which, when combined with the 
main effect for religiosity of -0.11, means that each unit increase in the religiosity scale is 
associated with a decline in approval of around 0.2 for U.S. citizens. This relationship is robust 
when we control for age, gender and education in model 5, with little change in the coefficients 
denoting region. 
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Table 3 OLS regression models predicting approval of stem-cell research (unstandardized estimates and t-values) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
U.S. 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.30*** 
 (13.17) (16.19) (16.32) (15.83) (11.84) (7.86) (18.38) (18.74) (12.00) 
          
CAN 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.29*** 
 (13.16) (13.76) (13.69) (13.44) (9.89) (7.97) (17.04) (16.97) (11.52) 
          
Religiosity  -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 
  (-16.82) (-13.52) (-11.84) (-8.61) (-9.25) (-7.53) (-6.93) (-5.13) 
          
Relig x U.S.   -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.05* 0.02 -0.02 -0.04* -0.00 
   (-3.54) (-4.05) (-2.14) (0.95) (-1.06) (-2.33) (-0.16) 
          
Relig x CAN   -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
   (-1.09) (-1.37) (-0.81) (0.15) (0.07) (-1.43) (-0.83) 
          
Female    -0.06*** -0.04** -0.05** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.03** 
    (-3.69) (-2.67) (-3.05) (-3.64) (-3.37) (-2.67) 
          
25-34    0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
    (0.50) (0.42) (0.37) (-0.02) (0.02) (-0.00) 
          
35-44    0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
    (1.51) (0.95) (0.85) (0.67) (0.77) (0.38) 
          
45-54    0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
    (0.64) (0.04) (0.00) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.89) 
          
55-64    -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08** 
    (-0.22) (-1.27) (-1.38) (-1.80) (-1.90) (-2.71) 
          
65+    -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 
    (-0.15) (-1.12) (-1.16) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-1.92) 
Field Code Changed
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
          
          
High school    0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.02 0.02 0.01 
    (3.12) (2.74) (2.92) (1.14) (0.87) (0.75) 
          
College+    0.23*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 
    (9.15) (7.72) (7.77) (4.81) (4.44) (3.63) 
          
Still studying    0.22*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.09** 0.08* 0.07 
    (5.27) (4.47) (4.52) (2.60) (2.34) (1.87) 
          
EducationDK    0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
    (0.52) (0.29) (0.31) (0.04) (-0.00) (-0.14) 
          
Moral     0.24*** 0.20***   0.13*** 
     (30.35) (22.46)   (16.29) 
          
Moral x U.S.      0.25***   0.17*** 
      (10.11)   (7.01) 
          
Moral x CAN      0.14***   0.12*** 
      (5.19)   (4.39) 
          
Benefit       0.56*** 0.62*** 0.59*** 
       (63.07) (59.06) (57.09) 
          
Ben x U.S.        -0.16*** -0.31*** 
        (-6.56) (-11.33) 
          
Ben x CAN        -0.25*** -0.35*** 
        (-8.90) (-11.43) 
R2 0.028 0.053 0.038 0.056 0.136 0.144 0.316 0.324 0.356 
t statistics in parentheses. N=10761 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Looking across table 3 to model 6, we introduce our measure of moral judgment on stem-cell 
research. The effect is statistically significant and positive – in other words, the belief that stem-
cell research is morally acceptable is associated with its approval. More interesting is that when 
we examine the interaction between region and moral attitude, we find a significant positive 
effect for both Canada and the U.S. That is to say, moral attitudes are more consequential for 
public approval in both North American countries compared to Europe. 
 
In models 7 to 9 we tested the same idea, only in this case with beliefs about the potential 
benefits of stem-cell research. The coefficient for benefit (0.56) in model 7 is substantial and 
statistically significant. Approval of stem-cell research is strongly tied to beliefs about its 
potential benefits. To see whether these beliefs are more or less important in different regions, 
in model 8 we added the interaction terms as we did for moral attitudes. We find that they are 
negative for both Canada and the U.S:  the effect of benefit beliefs on approval is smaller in 
North America than in Europe. That is to say that how useful North Americans believe stem-
cell research to be is less important than it is for Europeans in determining how likely they are 
to approve of it. In the final model, we simultaneously fitted both interactions. As can be seen, 
the results are substantively unchanged, with all the interaction terms remaining significant and 
of similar magnitude. Important also to note is that our final model explained more than 30 
percent of the variation in approval for stem-cell research. While this leaves open the possibility 
that other systematic unmeasured factors are important for a full understanding of public 
opinion on the issue, it does mean that the dimensions we have investigated here are of 
substantial importance.    
Robustness check 
In treating 25 European countries a single bloc, we of course run the risk of masking substantial 
heterogeneity. To check whether this was a significant problem, we re-estimated the models 
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within each of the 25 countries separately. We found that the pattern of coefficients was very 
similar within each European country to the overall results treating countries as a bloc, as 
reported above. In particular, no European country’s ranking in the size of coefficients for moral 
and benefit resemble those for the U.S. and Canada. We are confident, therefore, that we have 
identified dimensions of difference that are substantially ‘transatlantic’ in nature.    
 
Discussion 
Despite elite voices that have been critical of stem-cell research in Europe, Canada and the U.S., 
the majority of the public has been supportive for the past decade. But the fault lines of 
contemporary bioethics are reflected in public views. Religion plays an important part in many 
people’s lives,  and appeals to religion have been prominent in the stem-cell debate, especially 
in the U.S. but also in some some predominantly Catholic European countries [34](34). Yet in 
the case of stem-cell research it does not always result in positions of closure, pitting science 
against religion or religious versus secular world-views. While a sizeable fraction of the most 
religious want a veto on stem-cell research, many equally religious people have been willing to 
support it. 
 
Our findings are consistent with the premise that public views on stem-cell research are framed 
by at least two key dimensions – moral concerns and beliefs about benefits. Although it would 
be unwise from survey data such as this to conclude that publics are weighing formal ethical 
positions against each other, we believe that the attitudinal positions we identify in our analyses 
to some degree map on to conventional ethical positions towards human life: namely, the 
sanctity of life and the quality of life. Even taking into account standard demographic 
groupings, perceptions of the benefits and of the moral acceptability of stem-cell research point 
to differences in views that go beyond what one might expect based on, for instance, religious 
and educational cleavages in the population. That is to say, both the more and less religious can 
Field Code Changed
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differ in how much these two ethical dimensions underpin their opinions about stem-cell 
research. Moreover, the relative importance of these ethical positions differs not only between 
individual citizens but also between the U.S., Canada and Europe. In Europe particularly, given 
the greater relative importance of perceived benefits of stem-cell research, public support is 
likely to be strongly conditional on perceived progress towards the promised cures for diseases. 
In the U.S., where considerations of moral acceptability assume more importance than 
consideration of benefits, continued support for stem-cell research may be conditional to a 
greater extent on how embryonic stem-cells are obtained. whether political debate develops in a 
direction that emphasises sanctity of life over other considerations. At all events, the benefits 
need to be perceived as greater by Americans compared Europeans in order to be persuasive in 
the face of strong moral concerns.  
 
Finally, while support for stem-cell research has grown in the U.S. during the past decade, there 
are political currents that exist – for instance the partisan positions on abortion – that may yet 
lead to a reversal of the trend. Some commentators have suggested that we have entered a ‘post-
truth’ era [35](35). If this is really so, we can expect to see shared values and norms, or indeed 
‘public ethics’, becoming even more relevant for understanding how sensitive technologies 
enter into the public sphere and how public policy is framed in response.   
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Supporting information 
S1 File. analysis stemcellplosone.do. Stata do-file containing code used to run models. 
 
S2 File. stemcell sensitivity analysis.xlsx. Excel file containing results of robustness check. 
 
S3 File. stemcelldata.dta. Data file in Stata format used in the analysis. 
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